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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ACC Application Visibility & Control 
App-ID Application Identification 
ARP Address Resolution Protocol 
ASDM Adaptive Security Device Manager 
AV Anti-Virus 
 CLI Command Line Interface 
DB Database 
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service 
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
DNS Domain Name Service 
DoS Denial of Service 
 GUI Graphical User Interface 
HA High Availability 
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure 
IKE Internet Key Exchange 
IKEv2 Internet Key Exchange version 2 
IPsec Internet Protocol Security 
KVM Kernel-based Virtual Machine 
LAN Local Area Network 
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 
MAC Media Access Control 
NAT Network Address Translation 
NGFW Next-Generation Firewall 
OS Operating System 
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PA Palo Alto 
PAT Port Address Translation 
QoS Quality of Service 
RAM Random Access Memory 
SA Security Association 
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol 
SOHO Small Office/Home Office 
SSH Secure Shell 
SSL Secure Sockets Layer 
TCB Transport Control Block 
TCP Transport Control Protocol 
TFTP Trivial File Transfer Protocol 
UDP User Datagram Protocol 
UI User Interface 
URL Uniform Resource Locator 
User-ID User Identification 
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network 
VM Virtual Machine 
VPN Virtual Private Network 
WAN Wide Area Network 
WF WildFire (Appliance) 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
As Internet expands and technologies behind it develop rapidly so does the 
applications that generate traffic traversing it. The said traffic is not only Web 
surfing, but applications being accessed by network users for both personal and 
business use. Many of the said applications improve user and business 
productivity, while some consume large amounts of bandwidth, pose needless 
security risks, and increase business liabilities. (Miller 2011.) 
 
As Internet develops, so does the threat landscape. Applications have become 
evasive and utilize, e.g., encryption to ensure the privacy and protection of data 
that is being sent via untrusted networks. Enterprises have also simultaneously 
utilized different kinds of security solutions, e.g., IPSs, proxies and other complex 
appliances alongside traditional firewalls to enhance their security policies. Such 
networks containing complex interconnected security devices are troublesome to 
manage and are expensive to maintain in the long run, not to mention issues 
regarding scalability. (Miller 2011.) 
 
To fight against such developing and increasing threat landscape, next-
generation firewalls are deployed on enterprise networks to give security teams 
freedom to enhance and enforce company’s security policies. Next-Generation 
firewalls utilize the basic, port-based, technologies of traditional firewalls, but 
utilize more advanced and heuristic technologies in conjunction, e.g., URL 
filtering and sandboxed environments to fight against unknown threats. (Miller 
2011.) 
  
The goal of this bachelor’s thesis is to research, to design and to create case 
study material regarding next-generation firewalls for students of the South-
Eastern University of Applied Sciences by utilizing virtual laboratories. The case 
study material is to be heavily based on teaching material provided by Palo Alto 
Networks. 
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The case study is to provide understanding about fundamental firewalling 
technologies and best practices. The main goal was to teach students to think of 
networks surrounding firewall as indistinct security zones. There was also the 
need to be an emphasis on security policy management.  
 
Besides giving basic understanding about the NGFW appliance itself the basic 
configuration emphasizes the importance of zones regarding interface 
configuration. The basic policies consist of allowing traffic to flow between 
trusted, untrusted and DMZ networks although so that DMZ and untrusted 
networks aren’t allowed to initiate traffic to trusted network. Trusted network is 
allowed to initiate connections to untrusted network and the traffic is allowed to 
return if not detected as malicious. This includes and demonstrates the implicit 
deny rule of firewalls; everything is denied by default if not explicitly allowed by 
another rule. 
 
The more advanced features were to consist of proprietary technologies (see 
chapter 4) provided by the NGFW appliance retailers. Most of such technologies 
vary greatly between retailers. Also, reporting of logs was to be taken into 
consideration to emphasize the importance of incident reporting which is usually 
defined by company policies. Also, it is considered the best practice that firewall 
reporting is reviewed at regular intervals. 
 
All the contents of case study are further discussed in chapter 5.5. 
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2 FIREWALLS 
Firewalls are designed to filter network traffic, enforce various security policies 
and protect the network against external attacks. Firewalls act as security 
gateways which inspect the ingress and egress traffic between LAN and WAN 
networks. By default, all firewalls filter and allow traffic to flow if it matches a 
specific rule exception. Otherwise all traffic will be denied by an implicit deny-all 
rule that is the final and absolute rule of a firewall. (Stewart 2014, 44-45.) 
 
As Stewart mentions; “Listing the types of firewalls is almost like listing the 
taxonomy of the animal kingdom in biology. The variations, models, and versions 
are numerous. In addition, opinions vary about what is and is not a firewall.” 
(2014, 66.) 
 
2.1 Traditional Firewalls 
Traditional firewalls or legacy firewalls at their most basic level control traffic flow 
between a trusted network and an untrusted or public network. The most 
commonly deployed ones today are port-based or variations of such a firewall 
appliance. (Miller 2011, 6.) Miller also (2011, 6) phrases it; “These firewalls are 
popular because they are relatively simple to operate and maintain, generally 
inexpensive, have good throughput, and have been the prevalent design for more 
than two decades”. As the given devices are dependent on port-based filtering, 
understanding of TCP/UDP is mandatory. 
 
Traditional firewalls operate typically using either stateless or stateful method for 
the flowing traffic. The statelessly monitored traffic simply checks over each 
packet individually and is not able to discern a traffic “flow”. Statefully monitored 
traffic is kept track of where the flow is within its lifetime. (Wilkins, 2014.) TCP 
streams are an example of such a stateful traffic and is explained in chapter 3.1. 
 
The following sub-chapters list and explain the ideas behind some of the most 
common categorizations of traditional firewalls. 
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2.1.1 Personal Firewalls 
Personal firewalls are designed and implemented to protect a single host from 
unauthorized access. Personal firewalls also integrate additional capabilities such 
as antivirus software monitoring, behavioral analysis and intrusion detection for 
added protection. (andy 2007.)  
 
Also, as andy (2007) mentions; “Whereas personal firewalls make immense 
sense in the SOHO and home user market because they provide the end user 
protection as well as control of the policy, in the enterprise the issues are more 
complex. Perhaps the biggest concern for enterprise users with regard to 
personal firewalls is the ability to provide a centralized policy control mechanism 
for the firewall. The need to centralize policy control is critical to the use of 
personal firewalls in an enterprise environment to minimize the administrative 
burden.” 
 
Personal firewalls, which are mostly application-level (software) firewalls, today 
are offered as commercial and open-source by a plethora of companies and 
providers, e.g., Symantec, Comodo, Check Point, Malwarebytes. 
Although personal firewalls are quite capable of analyzing and preventing threats 
from outside network, enterprises need to centralize and enforce their own 
policies and because of this hardware network firewalls are usually mandatory in 
such environments. 
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2.1.2 Network Firewalls 
Enterprises deploy network firewalls, in addition to personal firewalls to enforce 
and centralize their own policies and control the flow of traffic in-between outside 
and inside network. 
 
Network firewalls are commonly classified in three different types; 
 
Packet-filtering firewalls which are either static or stateful (dynamic).  
In static filtering, the firewall uses a static or fixed set of rules to filter network 
traffic. The rules can focus on source or destination IP address, source or 
destination port number, IP header protocol field value, ICMP types, 
fragmentation flags, and IP options. Static filtering mainly focuses on Network 
Layer (Layer 3) of OSI, but can also include elements of Transport Layer (Layer 
4). (Stewart 2014, 69.) 
 
Stateful filtering (dynamic filtering) addresses the issue of more complex 
malicious traffic by determining whether or not a current packet is part of an 
existing session, and allow / deny decisions are made based on this 
determination. A state is a session of communication which refers to the 
Transport Layer (Layer 4) protocol TCP’s (see chapter 3.1) virtual circuits 
established through the three-way handshake. However, stateful inspection 
systems can also track communications in Layers 5-7. The track of current 
sessions is kept in a state table stored in memory. (Stewart 2014, 69-70.) 
Although being engineered to address the aforementioned issue, stateful filtering 
is still vulnerable by design, as the header contents can be manipulated to make 
malicious traffic look to be a part of an existing valid session. Even if the firewall 
can keep advanced details about the session, such as sequencing and 
acknowledge numbers (see chapter 3.1), a hacker can eavesdrop the traffic and 
learn the logic behind them to for prediction attacks. (Stewart 2014, 70.) 
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Circuit-level gateways (or Circuit proxies) which focus filtering on the initial setup 
process of a session, state, or circuit. This given form of filtering focuses on 
layers from 3 to 5 and functions similarly to application proxies, as it acts as a 
middleman (See Figure 1.) between the communication of a client and a server. 
This prevents direct connection existing between the client and server to protect 
the network. (Stewart 2014, 71.) 
 
Circuit proxies make allow or deny decisions on the initiation of the session, 
state, or circuit and after a circuit is allowed, no further filtering takes place. All of 
the communication from there on is unfiltered and unmonitored, at least by the 
circuit proxy itself. (Stewart 2014, 71.) 
 
The filtering rules of circuit proxies are quite similar to those of static packet 
filtering. The rules decide to allow and block on the basis of IP addresses, port 
numbers, domain names and networks. The firewall can function on the basis of 
either blocking all and allowing exceptions or allow all and deny exceptions. 
(Stewart 2014, 71.) 
 
 
Figure 1. Circuit Level Gateway Firewall (Bankexamstoday 2015) 
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Application-level gateways act as an application-specific version of a packet filter. 
However, unlike a static packet filter that is only able to inspect the header of a 
packet or segment, an application proxy is able to inspect traffic fully at any layer, 
including the application payload. Although given the name firewall or gateway, 
application proxy acts as the middleman in-between traffic just like circuit-level 
proxies (See Figure 2.) and thus grants the firewall the ability to inspect 
application-specific elements of the traffic, e.g., e-mail, Web, file transfer, 
database access, VoIP and other TCP/IP sub-protocols are available. (Stewart 
2014, 70-71.) 
 
Usually when application proxy is deployed, all client software is reconfigured to 
point its communications to the proxy server rather than the actual resource 
server. The application proxy reassembles the request packets before sending 
them to the resource server. The application proxy maintains two connections, 
one between itself and the client and a second between itself and the resource 
server, thus being able to inspect every aspect of an application’s 
communications through disassembling and reassembling content of the 
application payloads. This is known as deep packet inspection. (Stewart 2014, 
71.) 
 
As Stewart (2014) emphasizes; 
 
“The primary limitation of application proxy firewalls is that each 
unique application will need its own dedicated application proxy. 
Generic proxy systems are usually ineffective.” 
 
Although firewalls are commonly placed in such three main categories, many of 
them have characteristics that place them in more than one classification. 
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Figure 2. Proxy firewall session establishment (Blair, R. & Durai, A. 2009) 
 
2.2 Next-Generation Firewalls 
As Miller (2011, 12-13) states; 
 
“In the rapid pace of the Internet Age, nearly two decades means the 
basic technology behind port-based firewalls is medieval. In fact, 
network security is often likened to the Dark Ages — a network 
perimeter is analogous to the walls of a castle, with a firewall 
controlling access — like a drawbridge. And like a drawbridge that is 
either up or down, a port-based firewall is limited to just two options 
for controlling network traffic: allow or block. — 
 
— IT organizations have tried to compensate for deficiencies in 
traditional port-based firewalls by surrounding them with proxies, 
intrusion prevention systems, URL filtering, and other costly and 
complex devices, all of which are equally ineffective in today’s 
application and threat landscape.” 
 
As mentioned afore, traditional types of firewalls themselves don’t offer as liable 
security as they once did. Internet and network related threats have evolved 
tremendously and a new generation of security devices are necessary to prevent 
e.g., data leakages and DDoS attacks. 
 
Next-Generation Firewall devices process data streams based on applications 
and thus allowing distinguishing and granularly controlling otherwise evasive 
network traffic, although requiring multi-factor approach to determine applications 
identity regardless of port, protocol or encryption (Miller, 2011). 
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The given thesis will mainly cover Palo Alto Networks’ Next-Generation Firewalls 
and technologies they offer and are further discussed in following chapters. 
 
3 NETWORK PROTOCOLS AND VULNERABILITIES 
A network protocol defines rules and conventions for communication between 
network devices. Network protocols include mechanisms for devices to identify 
and make connections with each other, as well as formatting rules that specify 
how data is packaged into messages sent and received. (Mitchell 2017.) 
 
Several standardization communities and organizations have been established 
since the global research of packet radio and packet switched networks in the 
early 1960’s. Most notable of these organizations is ARPANET. (Leiner et al. s.a.; 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency s.a.) 
 
All network protocols lean heavily on The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 
conceptual model which was produced by International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) in 1984 (Kucharik 2002). 
 
The most relevant networking and Internet protocols regarding firewall operation 
and the given bachelor’s thesis are explained and discussed in the following sub-
chapters. Some of the most common and relevant vulnerabilities are covered as 
well. 
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3.1 TCP 
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is intended for use as a highly reliable 
host-to-host protocol between hosts in packet-switched computer communication 
networks, and in interconnected systems of such networks. (Postel 1981a, 1.) 
The header of a TCP packet can be seen in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. TCP Header (Postel, J. 1981a) 
 
TCP traffic flow may be divided into three phases: 3-way handshake (connection 
establishment), transmission of data (data transfer) and closing of the established 
virtual circuit (connection termination). In the following figure 4. is presented the 
said TCP traffic and all three phases of a TCP session.  
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Figure 4. TCP 3-way handshake 
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3.1.1 Port Scanning 
Port scanning occurs when a remote host sends IP packets containing ‘TCP 
SYN’ segments to different destination ports of a server or another host device. 
After the host receives the ‘SYN/ACK’ packet it resets the connection as it 
doesn’t need to establish a full connection. The purpose of such an attack is to 
scan the available services and identify vulnerable targets. (Juniper Networks 
2016.) Port scanning itself is just the reconnaissance part of an attack and the 
basic operating model can be seen in figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Port Scanning in action for port 80. (Messer, J. 2007) 
 
3.1.2 TCP Split Handshake 
TCP Split Handshake is a technique used by attackers that exploits TCP’s three-
way handshake’s (See chapter 3.1) slightly different but legitimate variant of four-
way handshake. The given variant can be seen in figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. Four-Way Handshake (Passeri 2011) 
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3.1.3 TCP SYN Flood attack 
TCP SYN Flooding abuses the basic design of TCP connection establishment 
through TCP Packet data structure (see chapter 3.1) that is known as 
Transmission Control Block (TCB). TCB contains information about local and 
remote socket numbers, sent and received buffers, security and priority values, 
and the current segment in the queue. It also manages sent and received 
sequence numbers. (Omnisecu s.a..) This kind of attack is a clear potential DoS 
attack and the goal is to deplete the backlog of target system (Wesley s.a.). 
 
As seen in figure 7, the attacker sends a flood of SYN packets to target 
destination with a bogus IP address, so that when the server receives the 
requests it will open the given port and send a SYN-ACK flagged packets to 
bogus destinations which never sends ACK packet back. The connections are left 
open and the host stores TCB’s of the connection information to its memory and 
potentially overflows it, thus leaving no available kernel memory for potential 
legitimate customers.  
 
 
Figure 7. SYN Flood spoofing attack and how it affects legitimate users 
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Figure 8. Some variants of SYN Flood attack (Wesley, M., E. & Verizon Federal Network Systems 
s.a.) 
 
The sort of attack depicted afore is known as a spoofing attack which is much 
more complex as opposed to a direct one. The main differences can be seen in 
figure 8. In a direct attack the attacker doesn’t spoof IP addresses. 
Direct attacks are much easier to defend against as the source is singular. 
The most advanced and complex type of attack is considered to be distributed by 
utilizing “botnets” or “drone armies”. The attacker sends commands directly to the 
attacking bots which allows the attacker to remain untraceable when compared to 
a direct attack. The effectiveness of the attack can be increased by making each 
bot utilize IP address spoofing. (Wesley s.a..) 
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3.2 UDP 
The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) is defined to make available a datagram 
mode of packet-switched computer communication in the environment of an 
interconnected set of computer networks. UDP provides a procedure for 
application programs to send messages to other programs with a minimum of 
protocol mechanism. The protocol is transaction oriented, and delivery and 
duplicate protection are not guaranteed, unlike in TCP-oriented connections. 
(Postel 1981a, 1.) UDP is used in situations where it doesn’t matter if data is lost 
in transit; e.g., media streaming, TFTP, internet gaming or VoIP. The header of a 
UDP packet is shown in figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9. UDP Header (Postel, J. 1980) 
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3.3 IPv4 & IPv6 
IPv4, formerly called just “Internet Protocol”, was designed to be used in 
interconnected systems of packet-switched computer communication networks. 
Such networks were called “catenets” which is the today’s equivalent of “LAN”. 
The purpose of IPv4 is to provide transmission of blocks of data called datagrams 
from sources to destinations, where sources and destinations are hosts identified 
by fixed length addresses. The protocol also provides for fragmentation and 
reassembly of long datagrams. (Postel 1981b.) 
 
The IPv4 packet header is 32 bits long and so are addresses used as well. The 
IPv4 header and its contents can be observed in figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10. Internet Datagram Header (Postel, J. 1981b) 
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IPv6 is a newer version of IPv4 and is designed to be a successor for it. The 
most notable improvement of IPv6 is the expanded addressing capabilities of it; 
the IP address size is increased from 32 bits to 128 bits and thus supports more 
levels of addressing hierarchy, a much greater number of addressable nodes, 
and simpler auto-configuration of addresses. Also some of the IPv4 header fields 
have been dropped or made optional, to reduce common-case processing cost of 
packet handling and to limit the bandwidth cost. (Deering & Hinden 1998.) 
 
The contents of IPv6 packet header can be observed in figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11. IPv6 Packet Header (Deering, S. & Hinden, R. 1998) 
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IP Spoofing is based on the design of TCP session sequence numbering (see 
Chapter 3.1) and IP header (See chapter 3.3) modification itself. Several attacks 
exploit TCP/IP’s design since they need to build sessions, albeit falsely. (Tanase 
2003.) The following attacks employ the said protocols as stated by Tanase 
(2003); 
 
Non-Blind Spoofing takes place when the attacker is on the same subnet as the 
victim itself. The sequence and acknowledgement numbers can be sniffed, 
eliminating the potential difficulty of calculating them accurately. The biggest 
threat of spoofing in this instance would be session hijacking. This is 
accomplished by corrupting the data stream of an established connection, then 
re-establishing it based on correct sequence and acknowledgement numbers 
with the attack machine. (Tanase 2003.) 
 
Blind Spoofing is a more sophisticated attack, because the sequence and 
acknowledgement numbers are unreachable. In order to circumvent this, several 
packets are sent to the target machine in order to sample sequence numbers. It 
was relatively easy to discover the exact formula of sequencing by studying 
packets and TCP sessions. Today most OS’ are implemented with random 
sequence number generation to make accurate prediction difficult. (Tanase 
2003.) 
 
Denial of Service Attack uses IP spoofing to prolong the length of attack. The 
attack itself is quite difficult to defend against since attackers are most of time 
only concerned with consuming bandwidth and resources of target. Thus 
spoofing source IP addresses makes tracing and stopping the DoS as difficult as 
possible. (Tanase 2003.) 
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3.4 IPSec 
IPsec is a protocol that creates a boundary between unprotected and protected 
interfaces, for a host or a network. Traffic traversing the boundary is subject to 
the access controls specified by the user or administrator responsible for the 
IPSec configuration. (Kent & Seo 2005.) 
 
As Frankel and Krishnan (2011) point out, IPsec suite protocol is composed of 
the following protocols that perform various security service functions; 
 
Authentication Header (AH) provides integrity protection and data-origin 
authentication, access control, and, optionally replay protection. A transport mode 
AH SA, used to protect peer-to-peer communications, protects upper-layer data, 
as well as those portions of the IP header that do not vary predictably during 
packet delivery. Tunnel mode AH SA can be used to protect the inner (original) 
header and the upper-layer data, as well as those portions of the outer (tunnel) 
header that do not vary unpredictably during packet delivery. AH also does not 
work in the presence of NAT. 
 
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) provides confidentiality (encryption) 
and/or integrity protection; it also provides data-origin authentication, access 
control, and, optionally, replay and/or traffic analysis protection. A transport mode 
ESP SA protects the upper-layer data and the inner header, but not the outer 
header. 
 
3.5 IKE 
IKE is an IPsec standard protocol used to ensure security for VPN negotiation 
and remote host or network access. IKE defines an automatic means of 
negotiation and authentication for IPsec SAs which are security policies defined 
for communication between two or more entities. The given relationship is 
presented by a key. IKE ensures security for SA communication without the 
preconfiguration that would otherwise be required. (Rouse 2009.) 
27 
IKE itself is not a prequisite of IPsec but it offers number of benefits, including: 
automatic negotiation and authentication; anti-replay services; certificate authority 
support; and the ability to change encryption keys during an IPsec session. 
(Rouse 2009.) 
 
3.6 TLS 
The primary goal of TLS protocol is to provide privacy and data integrity between 
two communicating applications. The protocol is composed of two layers: the TLS 
Record Protocol and the TLS Handshake Protocol. At the lowest level, layered on 
top of some reliable transport protocol (e.g., TCP), is the TLS Record Protocol. 
The TLS Record Protocol provides connection security that has two basic 
properties: connection privacy and connection reliability. Privacy is achieved by 
using symmetric cryptography for data encryption. The keys for said encryption 
are generated uniquely for each connection and are based on a secret negotiated 
by another protocol. Reliability is achieved by including a message integrity check 
using keyed MAC. Secure hash functions are used for MAC computations. 
(Dierks & Rescorla 2008.) 
 
As stated by Dierks and Rescorla (2008), the TLS Handshake Protocol provides 
connection security that has three basic properties: 
 
• Peer identity authentication using asymmetric, or public key, 
cryptography. 
 
• The negotiation of a shared secret is secure: the 
negotiated secret is unavailable to eavesdroppers, and for any 
authenticated connection the secret cannot be obtained, even 
by an attacker who can place himself in the middle of the 
connection. 
 
• The negotiation is reliable: no attacker can modify the 
negotiation communication without being detected by the 
parties to the communication. 
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4 PALO ALTO NETWORKS  
Palo Alto Networks was founded in 2005 by a former Israeli engineer Nir Zuk. 
Zuk worked at Check Point Software Technologies in the 1990’s and was writing 
parts of the world’s first commercial firewall at the time. Later on, he moved onto 
building essential chunks of a firewall which was sold by Juniper Networks. 
(Melby 2013.) As Melby (2013) wrote the statement of Zuk in an interview;  
 
“But at both companies, Zuk ended up quitting in a huff--and, in one 
case, walking away from millions of dollars in unvested stock options. 
Why? The Israeli engineer felt his best ideas were being blocked by 
incompetence and office politics. All he ever wanted, he insists, was 
to build new things.” 
 
With a revenge-like intention Zuk founded a company which sells the first new 
class of firewall. Ever since Palo Alto Networks has been rapidly gaining an ever-
larger share of the network security market. (Melby 2013;Palo Alto Networks 
2017g.)  
 
Palo Alto Networks has also acquisitioned some of the rival companies and 
integrated the technologies they possessed to PA-appliances, such as 
LightCyber in 2017 (Palo Alto Networks 2017f) and Cyvera (Rao 2014). 
 
The following sub-chapters cover the technologies and advanced features that 
Palo Alto firewall application solutions offer. 
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4.1 WildFire 
WildFire is engineered to fight against unknown malware and zero-day exploits. 
WildFire uses dynamic analysis to identify unknown files, that could be identified 
as zero-day malware, by utilizing virtualized sandboxing environment (Palo Alto 
Networks 2017n; Palo Alto Networks 2017m). WildFire utilizes a multi-technique 
approach in its operation that combines dynamic and static analysis, machine 
learning as well as bare metal analysis environment to detect and prevent even 
the most evasive and unknown threats (Palo Alto Networks 2017n). 
 
As Palo Alto Networks (2017o) states, the WildFire environment can be either 
public, private or hybrid-based, depending on which deployment method is 
preferred by the customer; 
 
• Public cloud utilized traffic forwarding to a publicly hosted WildFire 
environment to analyze the data. Public cloud environment will generate a 
new signature to distribute across the globe to all “Threat Prevention” 
subscribers. The regions are as follows;  
 
o United States 
o EU; Netherlands 
o Japan 
o Singapore 
 
• Private cloud utilizes a WF-500 appliance on the private network of an 
enterprise to host private cloud analysis. A single WF-500 appliance can 
receive and analyze data from up to 100 PA firewalls. 
• Hybrid cloud may forward certain traffic to WildFire public cloud and some 
to a private cloud appliance, thus allowing flexibility of analyzing sensitive 
content. 
 
Figure 12. is a simplified presentation of WildFire decision flow, where as in figure 
13. is a much more detailed presentation of the same flow of decisions. 
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Figure 12. A simplified WildFire decision workflow based on WildFire technical documentation.  
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Figure 13. A detailed WildFire Decision Flow (Palo Alto Networks 2017a) 
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4.2 App-ID 
App-ID is engineered to enable the security team of an enterprise to see the 
applications traversing through network by granularly decoding encrypted data 
streams. This method gives room for compromise- other than the choice of 
“either blocking everything or enabling everything”- in comparison to stateless 
inspection which relies on using source and destination IPs. Stateful inspection 
also strictly adheres to port-based classifying of TCP/UDP traffic (Palo Alto 
Networks 2015a). 
 
App-ID also uses stateful inspection as a part of its security policies, but will 
decrypt the traffic after determining TLS/SSH is in use. After determining such the 
traffic stream is granularly decrypted and the protocol decoded, be it either 
unknown or know traffic that needs decoding. In the case of unknown evasive 
applications heuristics can be applied to further analyze the behavior of the 
application. Heuristics can check packet length, session rate and packet sources 
for example to determine malicious application traffic. If the traffic is already 
identified, no decoding takes place and the policy is enforced and reported in 
logs. 
 
Figure 14. shows the App-ID traffic classification workflow. 
 
 
Figure 14. App-ID operating model chart (Palo Alto Networks 2015) 
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4.3 User-ID 
User-ID is used in conjunction with App-ID and Content-ID to give the ability to 
enable visibility, security policies, reporting, and forensics based on users and 
groups, instead of IP addresses. User-ID utilizes Microsoft Active Directory and 
LDAP services to identify traffic of a user and user groups to enforce policies. 
User-ID also improves visibility of application usage based on groups and users. 
In case of a security incident, forensics analysis and reporting based on user 
information provides a lot more complete picture of the given incident. (Palo Alto 
Networks 2016a.) 
 
Figure 15. is a simplified depiction of how User-ID works. 
 
 
Figure 15. User-ID operating model chart (Palo Alto Networks 2016a) 
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4.4 GlobalProtect 
GlobalProtect is a VPN service that can utilize and enforce all of the 
aforementioned security technologies whilst operating. It is engineered to give 
end-users the ability to connect to enterprise network, as it applies security 
policies to all users regardless of location and device in use. (Palo Alto Networks 
2017d.) The one major utility provided by GlobalProtect is the ability to inspect 
and enforce Host Information Profiles. The given technology offers security team 
the ability to inspect; 
 
• Operating system and application patch level 
• Host anti-malware version and state 
• Host firewall version and state 
• Disk encryption configuration 
• Data backup product configuration 
• Customized host conditions (e.g., registry entries and running software) 
 
Besides the given abilities, GlobalProtect also supports clientless SSL VPN for 
secure access to applications in the data center and the cloud from unmanaged 
devices. This approach offers convenience and security by providing access to 
specific applications through a web interface without requiring the user to install a 
client beforehand or set up a full tunnel (Palo Alto Networks 2017d). 
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4.5 VM-Series Deployments 
Palo Alto Networks offers a wide range of cloud and virtualization environment 
deployments to secure private, public and hybrid clouds. The virtual 
environments supported include: VMware® NSX™, ESXi™, vCloud® Air™, 
Citrix® Netscaler® SDX™, Microsoft® Azure® and Hyper-V®, Amazon® Web 
Services and KVM with optional support for the OpenStack® plugin. (Palo Alto 
Networks 2017i; Palo Alto Networks 2017j; Palo Alto Networks 2017k; Palo Alto 
Networks 2017l.) 
 
The VM-Series deployments function the same way as physical appliances, but 
are more flexible deployment-wise and can function in the cloud in parallel to 
other VMs. An example of a VM-series deployment on ESXi can be observed in 
figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16. VM-Series deployment on ESXi (Palo Alto Networks 2017k) 
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4.6 URL Filtering 
Palo Alto Networks URL Filtering technology is a service which enables and 
enforces secure web access through categorization of URLs. Such filtering allows 
security team to manage web traffic policies to be in line with organizational 
policies. (Palo Alto Networks 2017h; Palo Alto Network 2017e.) 
 
Palo Alto Networks also offers a real-time URL database which receives updates 
from WildFire every five minutes to counter and protect against malicious sites, in 
addition to other advanced identification techniques (Palo Alto Network 2017h; 
Palo Alto Network 2017e). 
 
4.7 Content-ID 
Content-ID by Palo Alto Networks is a single-pass architecture that combines 
multiple threat-prevention techniques into a single stream-based engine, as seen 
in Figure 17. The aforementioned techniques are this way handled as one bigger 
entity that inspects the flowing traffic and give security teams the ability to control 
application traffic and content. (Palo Alto Networks 2016b.) 
 
Content-ID (Palo Alto Networks 2017c; Palo Alto Networks 2017b) uses App-ID 
all the time to granularly decode and look for threats within application data 
streams and thus prevents threats tunneled via already otherwise approved 
applications, thus acting as a threat prevention mechanism. To reinforce IPS 
functionality, Content-ID uses the following mechanisms as stated in a tech brief; 
 
• Protocol decoders and anomaly detection 
• Stateful pattern matching 
• Statistical anomaly detection 
• Heuristic-based analysis 
• Invalid or malformed packet detection 
• IP defragmentation and TCP reassembly 
• Custom vulnerability and spyware phone-home signatures 
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To fight back against unknown malware and zero-day exploits, Content-ID also 
utilizes WildFire which utilizes cloud-based virtualized sandbox architecture 
without additional acquisition of hardware (see chapter 4.1).  
  
 
 
Figure 17. Palo Alto Networks single-pass parallel processing architecture (Palo Alto Networks 
2016b) 
 
Content-ID also allows traffic to be analyzed faster by utilizing parallel processing 
and thus minimizing latency and maximizing throughput. This is a lot faster in 
comparison to more traditional file-based scanning techniques utilized in most of 
the firewalls today, as seen in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18. Stream-based scanning’s effect on throughput performance (Palo Alto Networks 2016b 
 
5 CASE STUDY 
There was a need for case study material. The material was to cover the 
following; Basic implementation and configuration of network devices, Palo Alto 
firewall appliance and Cisco ASAv appliance. Also, there was a need to cover 
more advanced aspects of Palo Alto firewall and focus less on Cisco ASA itself. 
The case study material was to be heavily based on practice material provided by 
Palo Alto Networks, but needed revising to serve its purpose in the given 
scenarios. 
 
The decision to use a virtual environment instead of physical one was because of 
the possibility to use SIMTERNET (Kankare 2015) as an ISP network. The 
topology of SIMTERNET itself can be seen in the following figure 19. Also, the 
possibility to use Virtual Laboratory (Nurmi 2016) provided many benefits as 
described in chapter 5.1. 
 
Virtual Laboratory is run in “CyberLab” data center by South-Eastern University of 
Applied Sciences XAMK Ltd. and it encompasses of 12 servers which consist of 
over 300 cores and 3 TB’s of RAM. The Virtual Laboratory itself is a web based 
application that only requires user to have HTML5-based browser. The 
application does not require Java or any additional add-ons. (Kettunen 2017.) 
The Virtual Laboratory can be seen in action in figure 23. 
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Figure 19. SIMTERNET and its topology (Kankare 2015) 
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5.1 Benefits of Virtual Laboratory 
Working in the Virtual Laboratory (Nurmi 2016) provides many pedagogical and 
practical benefits for teaching, as Kettunen (2017) mentions; All the case study 
material that has been done with physical devices before converts to the 
virtualized environment as well and allows students to have more devices in each 
case study than previously possible. Also, the laboratories of each student can be 
easily interconnected to create collaborative study units. If there is a need, the 
teacher can easily manage, supervise and help with each laboratory session that 
is running on the servers. As the Virtual Laboratory can be accessed through 
secure VPN connection, regardless of location, device and time, the flexibility of 
studying outside of school hours is made possible. (Kettunen 2017.) 
 
There is also a way to simulate packet loss, bit errors and latency increases of 
individual links between virtual devices. If there is a need the student can also 
monitor and inspect the traffic of links by using a Wireshark sniffer. This is 
necessary if there is the need for troubleshooting connectivity problems. 
(Kettunen 2017.) 
 
5.2 Network Topology 
The network topology used in two different case studies can be seen in figure 20. 
The reason to have both case studies use the same topology is that the devices 
can be supplied to be pre-configured as necessary considering what is relevant 
to each of them. The case study consisted of twelve devices; three routers, seven 
Windows XP end devices of which two provided DMZ HTTP services and a Cisco 
ASAv and Palo Alto VM-100 firewall appliances. 
 
The link between R2 (Router 2) and SIMTERNET can be an address between 
239.0.0.96 – .99 Each address corresponds a different ISP operating inside 
SIMTERNET. Each ISP in SIMTERNET is interconnected with each other. 
 
The idea was to have two different imaginary enterprise locations. One that has 
deployed a Cisco ASA firewall and another one that has deployed Palo Alto 
41 
firewall appliance. Both of them are interconnected and can access services in 
SIMTERNET. Also each enterprise hosts their own DMZ web services and has a 
private IPSec VPN tunnel between each other for Site-to-Site connectivity. 
 
 
Figure 20. Palo Alto Firewall case study topology 
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5.3 Virtual Laboratory 
The Virtual Laboratory uses “.top” format that is a text file based topology file. 
The topology of figure 20. (Topology) can be observed as a text file in figure 21. 
 
The corresponding parameters are used as follows: 
 
Text line to be shown in user view: 
TEXT [x-coord.] [y-coord.] [Font size] [#Text color as hexadecimal] [#Background 
color as hexadecimal] [Text to be shown] 
 
Workstations: 
WORKS [Name] [x-coord.] [y-coord.] [Text to show on device] 
 
Routers: 
ROUTER [Name] [x-coord.] [y-coord.] 
 
Palo Alto Firewall: 
PALO_FIREWALL [Name] [x-coord.] [y-coord.] [Text to show on device] 
 
Generic Firewalls: 
FIREWALL [Name] [x-coord..] [y-coord..] [Text to show on device] 
 
Link to SIMTERNET: 
MCASTVPN [Name] [x-coord..] [y-coord..] [ISP Address 239.0.0.96 - .99] [Text to 
show on VPN] 
 
Cables to interconnect devices: 
CABLE [Device A] [Port] [Device B] [Port] [Text to show on cable] 
(The “\n” signifies line break) 
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Figure 21. The topology file of the case study as a “.top” file 
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Also an installation (“.inst”) file was made to be used in conjunction with “.top” file 
to create the laboratories from premade parameters. The installation file and its 
contents can be observed from figure 22. 
 
The parameters are used as follows: 
 
Topic to be listed in Virtual Laboratory available installations: 
TOPIC [Name] 
 
Topology file to be used for laboratory: 
TOPOLOGY [Path/To/File.top] 
 
Device and its hardware specifications: 
DEVICE [Name] [Path/To/Image.filetype] [RAM] [CPU Cores] [Network 
Interfaces] [Network Interface Model] [MAC base] [Display Type] [Console Port] 
[Display Driver] [Snapshot mode on/off] 
(MAC base can be “-“ to generate one automatically) 
 
Additional configuration lines: 
#DISABLE topo_upload (Disables the ability to upload own topology) 
#DISABLE topo_select (Disables the ability to select another topology) 
 
 
Figure 22. The installation file of the case study 
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Figure 23. A freshly installed Virtual Laboratory case study instance 
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5.4 Services in SIMTERNET 
The decision of using SIMTERNET as an alternative to real Internet connection 
meant that more services had to be implemented to test the capabilities of Palo 
Alto firewall. A simple Linux with Debian as distribution was chosen and 
implemented in SIMTERNET with the following services: Three different web 
sites that deliver content as unencrypted and encrypted traffic. The sites were to 
have video streaming and download services. All the sites are made with HTML5 
and CSS and were hosted using Apache 2. 
 
The first web site, “Timekill.com”, is an imaginary web hosting service provider. 
Timekill consists of simple text, image and link elements. It serves the purpose of 
being a generally generic site to access and to be distinguished in Palo Alto 
firewall network monitoring. The site and part of its contents are visible in figure 
24. 
 
 
Figure 24. Timekill.com site 
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The second web site, “Jyytube.com”, serves the purpose of bandwidth 
consuming video streaming. All the videos are courtesy of Pexels, which are 
licensed under Creative Commons Zero (CC0) license. The site and its videos 
can be observed in figure 25. 
 
 
Figure 25. Jyytube.com site 
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The third web site, “Hacker.com”, serves the purpose of storing downloadable 
vulnerable files that are used to test firewall’s security capabilities, such as 
antivirus, anti-spyware and file blocking. Most of the files are test files provided by 
EICAR (European Institute for Computer Antivirus Research). The “Paloalto 
testfiles” are provided originally by Palo Alto itself for WildFire and file blocking 
test purposes. The website can be seen in figure 26. 
 
The files provided by EICAR are designed to be seen by anti-malware as a virus, 
but it doesn't include any fragments of viral code. If the files themselves are run, a 
simple DOS program is run and the message "EICAR-STANDARD-ANTIVIRUS-
TEST-FILE!" is printed. The file itself is consists entirely of simple ASCII 
characters, so it can be easily created and modified with a text editor. (EICAR 
2017.) 
 
 
Figure 26. Hacker.com site with downloadable files 
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5.5 Content of the Case Study 
The case study was to cover the basic connectivity configuration which involves 
basic interface configuration, security zones and simple security policies for 
connectivity between trusted, untrusted and DMZ networks. The routing between 
networks is achieved by utilizing virtual routers of PA appliance that create 
dynamic and static routes between networks. implementation of NAT and DHCP 
was part of the most basic functions as well. The zones and security policies 
involving PA appliance in the case study can be seen from figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27. Security zones and security policies involving PA appliance in case study 
 
As the enterprises host DMZ web services, the need to implement “destination 
NAT” was relevant. It handles the HTTP requests from untrusted network coming 
to the IP address of the firewall to be redirected to the DMZ network’s subnetted 
host by utilizing security policies and NAT. All other application requests to DMZ 
are blocked by implicit deny rule.  
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The advanced features implemented revolved around the technologies provided 
by Palo Alto Networks and which are further discussed in chapter 4. 
Implementation of App-ID ensured that the most fundamental NGFW 
functionality, application identification, could be demonstrated. In addition to App-
ID, decryption and two self-signed certificates, trusted and untrusted, are 
generated and implemented as well to inspect the evasive traffic flow from liable 
sources. The self-signed trust certificate is also imported to trusted host devices. 
File blocking is taken into consideration as well in decryption to enable the 
scanning and blocking of possibly malicious file types. Figure 28 depicts 
application traffic that originates from trusted network to be filtered by App-ID. 
 
 
Figure 28. Basic App-ID implementation  
 
The PA appliance works as a forwarding proxy between the web server in 
untrusted network and the host in trusted network. As figure 14 depicts, if the 
application traffic is decrypted and identified it is matched with relevant security 
policies and either blocked or allowed and redirected to host. 
 
Site-to-Site VPN tunneling between PA and Cisco ASAv appliances was covered 
and implemented. The reason for it was to make possible the access to inside 
network resources between two physical enterprise locations. Also, the tunneling 
ensures integrity of data sent between these locations via untrusted network. 
Figure 20 shows the IPSec VPN tunnel between the enterprise networks 
traversing via untrusted network. 
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Figure 29. Basic implementation of Content-ID in the case study 
 
The implementation of Content-ID required that custom profiles were created. 
The given profiles included URL filtering, antivirus and anti-spyware. All the said 
technologies are joined as one by use of Content-ID, and flexible custom security 
profile groups. The figure 29 shows the simplified depiction of Content-ID and the 
said profiles in use. 
 
One of the most important feature for security teams is also covered in the case 
study; management of logs and generation of reports based on activity. Usually 
such reports are generated at regular intervals. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
The case study unit was completed, and the needed implementation goals (see 
chapter 1) were achieved. Also, a rather comprehensive study guide was 
created, although the timeframe of the original schedule could not be 
accomplished. 
 
Along the way hardware issues were present with virtual laboratory (Nurmi 2016) 
itself which were solved quite painlessly in the end. Also, technologies and 
practices regarding it changed as time progressed. The ease of creating and 
managing laboratories evolved and most of the text-based configurations of 
scenarios can be created through the Web GUI itself. 
 
The limiting factor regarding case studies was the limited range of applications in 
SIMTERNET that could be taken into consideration whilst designing security 
policies. Thankfully the ability to connect to Internet through VPN has been 
implemented in the virtual laboratory for future development. This itself affected 
the capabilities demonstration-wise of PA appliance in use. 
 
The given version of case study covers network that is implemented inside the 
enterprise network which doesn’t offer as wide spectrum of applications as 
Internet does. This itself limits the configuration capabilities of the PA appliance 
case study wise. Thus, the future studies should utilize Internet instead of 
SIMTERNET in that regard. Also, this would establish a need to implement QoS, 
GlobalProtect and DoS protection technologies in the case study. 
 
As the case study itself covers the fundamentals of each technology covered, 
each one should be researched and implemented further to give a more complete 
understanding and competency regarding the firewall appliance to students, e.g., 
Security Policies, App-ID, User-ID, Content-ID and WildFire.  
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WildFire in itself is the single most intriguing technology, which is only covered in 
theory in the current version of case study. Also, the implementation of User-ID 
through Windows AD or LDAP would enhance the incident reporting and network 
monitoring capabilities.  
 
Also, the possibility of supplying two different virtual images of PA appliance 
would give the possibility to test and implement High Availability (HA) in the 
future. 
 
The case studies could be revised so that two students host their own enterprise 
networks, behind a PA appliance(s), inside Virtual Laboratories and interconnect 
them with VPNs between each other. This implementation method would also 
establish more cooperation between students. 
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Device Configurations 
 
R1 
hostname R1 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
no aaa new-model 
ethernet lmi ce 
! 
mmi polling-interval 60 
no mmi auto-configure 
no mmi pvc 
mmi snmp-timeout 180 
! 
no ip domain lookup 
ip domain name company.fi 
ip cef 
no ipv6 cef 
! 
multilink bundle-name authenticated 
! 
redundancy 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/0 
 ip address 209.165.200.225 255.255.255.248 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
 media-type rj45 
 no shut 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
 ip address 10.1.1.1 255.255.255.0 
 ip nat outside 
 ip virtual-reassembly in 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
 media-type rj45 
 no shut 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/2 
 ip address 200.0.0.1 255.255.255.0 
 ip nat inside 
 ip virtual-reassembly in 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
 media-type rj45 
 no shut 
! 
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ip forward-protocol nd 
! 
! 
ip http server 
ip http authentication local 
ip http secure-server 
ip nat inside source list 1 interface GigabitEthernet0/2 overload 
ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 GigabitEthernet0/1 
ip route 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 GigabitEthernet0/0 
ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 dhcp 
! 
access-list 1 permit 200.0.0.0 0.0.0.255 
! 
line con 0 
 logging synchronous 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 
 logging synchronous 
 login local 
 transport input telnet ssh 
! 
no scheduler allocate 
! 
do wr 
! 
 
R2 
hostname R2 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/0 
 ip address 10.2.2.2 255.255.255.252 
 ip nat inside 
 no shut 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
 ip address 10.1.1.2 255.255.255.252 
 ip nat inside 
 no shut 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/2 
 ip address dhcp 
 ip nat outside 
 no shut 
! 
no ip http server 
no ip http secure-server 
ip nat inside source list 1 interface GigabitEthernet0/2 overload 
ip route 172.16.3.0 255.255.255.0 10.2.2.1 
ip route 200.0.0.0 255.255.255.0 10.1.1.1 
ip route 209.165.200.224 255.255.255.248 10.1.1.1 
ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 dhcp 
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!                  
!          
access-list 1 permit 200.0.0.0 0.0.0.255 
access-list 1 permit 209.165.200.224 0.0.0.7 
access-list 1 permit 172.16.3.0 0.0.0.255 
! 
do wr 
! 
 
Cisco ASA 
hostname CCNAS-ASA 
domain-name ccnasecurity.com 
enable password cisco 
! 
interface gig0/1 
nameif inside 
security-level 100 
ip address 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0 
no shut 
! 
interface gig0/0 
nameif outside 
security-level 0 
ip address 209.165.200.226 255.255.255.248 
no shut 
! 
interface gig0/2 
nameif dmz 
security-level 70 
ip address 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0 
no shut 
! 
object network inside-net 
subnet 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 
! 
object network dmz-server 
host 192.168.2.3 
! 
access-list OUTSIDE-DMZ extended permit ip any host 192.168.2.3 
! 
object network inside-net 
nat (inside,outside) dynamic interface 
! 
object network dmz-server 
nat (dmz,outside) static 209.165.200.227 
! 
access-group OUTSIDE-DMZ in interface outside 
! 
route outside 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 209.165.200.225 1 
! 
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username admin password admin 
! 
aaa authentication ssh console LOCAL 
aaa authentication http console LOCAL 
! 
http server enable 
http 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside 
ssh 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside 
ssh timeout 10 
! 
class-map inspection_default 
match default-inspection-traffic 
policy-map global_policy 
class inspection_default 
inspect icmp 
! 
crypto key generate rsa modulus 1024 
yes 
! 
wr mem 
! 
 
 
Palo Alto Firewall 
configure 
! 
set deviceconfig system ip-address 192.168.100.1 netmask 255.255.255.0 
! 
commit 
! 
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